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DATE 2007

7 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: OPC Liaison With Other Intelligence Services

1. I had two lengthy discussions with [redacted] of OPC on 6 March 1950 relative to OPC operational liaison with the Greek Intelligence Services. These were the last of a series of discussions between OPC and OSO on the general question of liaison.

Background

2. OPC for some time has had under consideration a British proposal that the French Intelligence, Italian Naval Intelligence and Papagos in Greece be informed that the Valuable Operation is an intelligence operation of the British in which the U.S. is interested. The British would make the approach to the Services. The clear implication from the above would be that the Valuable Operation is a joint U.S.-British enterprise.

3. This matter was first discussed several days ago with Mr. Angleton and later with Mr. Angleton and myself. The first conference, on 6 March, was between [redacted] and myself. and the second conference was between [redacted] and myself. In the first conferences with Mr. Angleton and later with Mr. Angleton and myself no decision could be reached due to the fact that OPC had not decided what their policies or desires were. OPC's decision with reference to the delivery of the Valuable debriefing would necessarily depend upon OPC's decision regarding future relations with the French, Italians and Greeks in regard to BGFIEND.

4. In the initial discussions OSO's position as expressed by Mr. Angleton was to the effect that we could see no basis for objecting to the British delivering the results of the Valuable debriefing to the Services provided the British did not state that the operation had any connection with the U.S.

We strongly objected to a joint British-OPC approach to either the Italian Service or the Greek Service.

Since it was mutually agreed that Greece was the preferable base for OPC operations against Albania, as well as Bulgaria, we could make available through existing contacts any facilities OPC might need in Greece.

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Results Current Conferences

5. [] informed me on 6 March that OPC and the British could not agree on a joint operational relationship with the French Intelligence Service, therefore OPC will handle its own operational contacts with the French Service, and OPC and the British will jointly work with the French on matters concerning the Albanian Committee as such. It is contemplated in this connection that a part of the Committee will be brought to the U.S. and the remainder in the future will be based in France.

6. [] informed me that they tentatively agreed that there would be no joint approach to the Italian Service. They had adopted the position that it was all right for the British to tell the Greeks that the U.S. was interested in the Valuable Operation at the time the British delivered the Valuable debriefings.

7. He stated that it was their view that in the near future a joint approach to Greek Intelligence should be made by the British and OPC. The latter's position was not definite and no specific request for our approval or disapproval for such an approach was made. He did, however, ask what would be our views. Our views were expressed as follows:

a) As to Italy we objected to any approach to the Italian Services. I told him that our and the U.S.'s interests were so great that I felt that the Director or the National Security Council would have to pass on any such joint approach to the Italians. He advised that they were not pressing the Italian liaison, although explaining to the British why there would be no joint approach would be embarrassing.

8. I objected to the Greeks being informed by the British that the U.S. was interested in the Valuable Operation on the following grounds:

a) Such notice to the Greeks is superfluous and entirely unnecessary. Such a statement by the British could serve no useful purpose and would do infinite damage to OSO interest and could only benefit the British. My reasoning was that the Greeks took care of the British agents, knew they were British agents, turned the agents over to the British and as a result of this service were entitled to the debriefing as a matter of courtesy, and except for a British effort to pacify the Greeks at U.S. expense, there was no reason to mention U.S. interest.

b) I further pointed out that since the Greeks knew of the extent of the operation, the use of the Corfu base, etc., we would be

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put into a position of lying to the Greeks. The Greeks would further suspect that since this was a joint operation, the information which they had furnished us concerning the matter and the Corfu base may well have been given to the British by us.

9. Objection to any joint OPC-British approach to the Greeks was made on the following basis:

a) Through our existing liaison we could give OPC everything they wanted in Greece. Why then hurt that liaison by bringing in the British when nothing additional could be accomplished.

b) The Director would be put in a most embarrassing position since his representative in Greece has previously denied any connection with the Free Albanian Committee, the Valuable Operation or the Corfu base.

10. The joint approach to the Greeks at this time, after the Committee had been formed and operations mounted with the Greek's knowledge, would seriously jeopardize present and future collaboration with the Greeks on an independent basis by either OPC or OSO, since the Greeks would in turn suspect that six months later they might learn that the British were in on the deal also.

11. [] proposed that the Greek Intelligence Service be informed that OPC and OSO were two separate organizations engaged on separate missions, and expressed the view that this would clarify the above matters in the minds of the Greeks. I told him that I did not believe that this would clarify the situation since, regardless of the fact that OPC and OSO are separate organizations, they are both a part of CIA and as such the Director of CIA is responsible for the activities of both organizations. Thus, statements, working arrangements and commitments made by our [] are those of CIA. I told him that if it could be denied that OPC is connected with CIA, the entire matter would be different, but that any such denial is impossible since in the liaison with the Greek Services, CIA would be blown at sometime or other. He asked what were our views with reference to OPC having liaison with the Greeks. I stated that we would prefer to handle liaison through our channels, however, I felt that we could work out some satisfactory arrangement if the British were not involved. [] stated that in effect we were trying to tell them how they should conduct their business. I told him yes, insofar as it related to other Intelligence Services and that I felt that this was within our jurisdiction as set out in Administrative Instruction 10-14. He stated that in effect what we were objecting to was OPC's relationship with the British and not their liaison with other services. I told him that we

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did object to their agreement with the British if it involved joint approaches with other Intelligence Services with which we had previous commitments and agreements.

Conclusion

12. [] agreed that the British would be informed that OPC had no objection to their passing the results of the Valuable debriefings to the other Services provided the British did not tell the other Services that the U.S. was interested in the Valuable Operation. He stated that among other objections to the British so informing other Services would be the main one that Valuable is an intelligence operation and that OPC had no jurisdiction to conduct intelligence operations.

13. [] agreed to submit a formal memorandum over Mr. Wisner's signature setting out OPC's views regarding joint British-OPC approaches to other Intelligence Services, including the Greeks, and OPC's proposals relative to liaison with the Greeks. I told him that we would answer such a memorandum stating OSO's position in regard to such joint approaches and liaisons.

2-1 14. During the conversation [] mentioned that from comments of Mr. Angelton and excerpts from documents which he had read it was clear that our operations into Albania with other Services were not limited to intelligence objectives. He immediately stated that there was no question as to our good faith in the matter and that we had made every effort to limit the operations to intelligence. I advised Mr. [] that it was clear to us that at least the initial phase of the BGFIEND Operations, including Valuable, was intelligence and not operational.

15. [] commented that since other Intelligence Services were engaged in both intelligence and operational activities, and since OSO was engaged only in intelligence and refused to participate in other types of activities, that other Intelligence Services were being misled as to U.S. activities; that this fact plus OPC's need for operational liaison with other Services brought up the question of the desirability of informing other Services of the fact that there were two organizations within CIA with different functions. In other words, that OPC should establish liaison with other Services.

16. It was clear during the discussions that the question of OPC liaison with other Services will come up as regards each Service when OPC has a need for the liaison, and that the fact that it is being attacked on an individual Service basis at this time is only because OPC has not needed other liaisons. It is recommended that the question of liaison with other Services be the subject of an OSO conference in which our policy is established as a whole and that the question be then resolved with OPC on whatever level may be necessary.

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